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KEYNOTE ADDRESS

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

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(SLIDE 1 – Austcare)

Introduction

(SLIDE 2 – Title)

I would like to thank the ADF Peacekeeping Centre for the opportunity to speak today. I would also like to congratulate the Centre for putting together such a terrific program. I only wish I could have attended such a course during my career, and particularly before my overseas UN assignments. I certainly would have been much better prepared.

I would also like to congratulate those nations present who have contributed to peacekeeping around the world.

(SLIDE 3 – Scope)

Scope

In this presentation I will:

- make some personal observations from my own experiences;
- summarise the evolution of peacekeeping;
- explain the UN system of command and control;
- highlight the importance of planning and preparation; and
- make some comments about the actual conduct of peacekeeping.

Preliminary Points

However, as one of your Keynote Speakers, let me first make three preliminary and somewhat contentious points which you might like to explore further during the course of the seminar.

(SLIDE 4 – MNFs versus PKFs)

The first is that some developed countries are now inclining to contribute more to short-duration Multinational Forces (MNFs) in the form of peace enforcement, and less to longer-term UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. Some of these countries want to “get in and get out quickly”, leaving the longer-term and often more difficult

peacebuilding duties to less-capable UN forces. Some countries are also showing less confidence in the UN to deal with complex peace operations, preferring to deal with them on a coalition basis – this partly reflects the inability of the UN to react quickly because of Security Council procedures and limited forces on immediate stand-by for deployment, and partly reflects the views of some influential member states that UN missions are often unsuccessful. In my view this is a mistake and I encourage all developed states to give more rather than less to UN peacekeeping. Only in this way will the effectiveness of the UN be improved.

My second point is that despite the significant contribution to peacekeeping by the ADF over many years, I believe a reappraisal of peace operations – including the role of the Peacekeeping Centre – and the ADF’s commitment to such operations is overdue. Peacekeeping, in all its guises, is now so important and so mainstream that it cannot be left to a small, under-resourced and remotely-located institute under the auspices of the ADF Warfare Centre. Recently, Austcare provided a submission on Peacekeeping to the Australian Senate Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade. In that submission, Austcare advocated for the creation of an independent and civilian-controlled centre of excellence that would bring together all government departments and non-government agencies concerned with peace operations.

(SLIDE 5 – UN Civilian Police)

As well, significant work is being done by the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to finalise its “Capstone Doctrine” on peace operations. This is an excellent document that clearly demonstrates the multi-dimensional nature of peace operations beyond military forces (the traditional blue helmets), to include civilian police and administrators, and the various humanitarian agencies.

(SLIDE 6 – Human Security)

My third point is that modern peace operations are linked to the achievement of “human security”, which is beyond the traditional understanding of national security, although not opposed to national security. Human security is about ensuring the rights of communities and individuals to live in peace and free from fear and want. In particular, human security is about the protection and empowerment of people to escape poverty. Moreover, military forces now have a

“responsibility to protect” civilians beyond that previously understood by the Geneva Convention and its Additional Protocols.

(SLIDES 7-13 – modern peacekeeping: combat, logistics, health, construction, civil- military interaction)

These additional photos taken from East Timor in 1999-2002, help illustrate some of the many facets of modern peace operations – which now embrace peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Increasingly, all of these roles can and do occur as part of peace operations, and often under robust rules of engagement that authorize the application of deadly force.

The ADF, and all militaries, can no longer distinguish between warfighting and peacekeeping. Military planning, force structuring and training must now concentrate on “grey operations” where the battlespace, civil governance, and humanitarian space overlap, and where the clash of opposing forces will most often be asymmetric and occur within civil society. In such circumstances, the lessons from counter-insurgency warfare have far more relevance than those of conventional warfare. There is a need for modern military forces to mainstream and promote the requirements for peace operations.

(SLIDE 14 – Civil-military Actors)

For peacekeeping to be effective, the military and civil elements must understand each other. The achievement of effective civil-military relations requires more attention by the ADF and most militaries. Success in peace operations depends in large measure on a mutual appreciation and understanding of and by the main actors. As shown on this slide, the military is but one actor. Agreement is not always easy, and compromises are inevitably required, but unless each of the actors understands the other then peace is likely to be illusory. Differences can and often do exist within and between mission components – for example, between the military, the police and humanitarian agencies – as well as between the UN mission itself, the host government (if one exists) and other key actors such as the World Bank Group. In East Timor, for example, the UN and the World Bank did not always see things the same way. Sadly, it is often the local community that is most disempowered in the decision-making process. Generally speaking within the ADF, too many senior commanders still remain unclear about peace operations and the UN’s role and regulations. Relatively few officers selected for key UN billets have subsequently been able to influence ADF policy to the extent that peace operations are considered to be on a par with warfighting.

(SLIDE 15)

Some Personal Observations

Many of my ideas are based on my personal observations from Kashmir, Cambodia in East Timor. The latter was Australia's largest military commitment since the Vietnam War, and I served as the first Deputy Commander of the UN Peacekeeping Force for 14 months.

During my time in the ADF I commanded at all levels from platoon to brigade, normally in a joint and often in a combined setting, concentrating primarily on warfighting. I enjoyed all of these appointments, and relished both the trials and travails that came with command. Life was not always pleasant from the bottom of a fox hole or along the steamy jungle paths, but I was generally in my comfort zone, mainly because I was never involved in actual combat. Of course, uncertainty and hardship were often present, but these existed within fairly clear boundaries about the application of force and the purpose of what I was doing.

In comparison to training for warfighting, however, I found my brief flirtations with peace operations to have been far more challenging and frustrating, and always outside my comfort zone. This was because the situations were real, with real people and everyday real problems. Nothing was scripted, and the majority of everyday real problems that required resolution usually remained unknown and of low priority to my national military headquarters and the people of my own country. In fact, the more successful you are in peace operations, the less likely you are to attract national attention – particularly when the UN is in control. And, of course, when you return home after having worked very hard to preserve peace - often under very difficult circumstances - nobody is much the wiser. This is understandable human behaviour, but the psychological effect on those who have participated may be longer-term and sometimes disturbing. In some countries this problem is starting to be acknowledged. Australian soldiers who served in Rwanda, in many of the villages of Cambodia, and throughout the length and breadth of East Timor have been placed in stressful situations not unlike the face of battle. No doubt, those who have served more recently in Afghanistan and Iraq will have had similar experiences.

As a young UN military observer in Kashmir I felt that some of us worked extremely hard walking the Pakistani pickets, mapping the line-of-control from the Pakistani side, living on goat knuckle and dahl, and dodging frequent avalanches and landslides. It was “Boys Own” stuff, and extremely exciting for a much younger and fitter Australian than stands before you today. But because of political problems, we Observers were able to achieve very little in practical terms. That Mission (UNMOGIP) has been in existence since 1949, yet Kashmir is no closer to resolution because of the UN’s presence. It is fair to ask what practical purpose that Mission has performed since the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, after which India refused to allow UN Observers to inspect their forward areas. From that point on, UNMOGIP effectively became a lame-duck Mission. It continues to exist, but achieves little, except for saying that the UN is prepared to be there in the interest of peace and for as long as India and Pakistan allow it to remain.

As Defence Attache in Cambodia I witnessed the legacy of a proclaimed successful UN Peacekeeping Mission – the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). A successful election was delivered by UNTAC in accordance with its mandate. But then the UN peacekeepers departed, leaving an unresolved situation with the Khmer Rouge, three factional armies still to be amalgamated, enormous unresolved crimes against humanity, a landscape poisoned with landmines, and considerable social dislocation caused in part by the improper behaviour by some of the peacekeeping contingents (prostitution, gambling, illegal trading and other criminal activity). The rule of law, so critical in all post-conflict environments had not been effectively re-established before UNTAC’s departure, and the artificial UN-centric local economy quickly crashed placing additional pressure on a struggling economy. Is it any wonder that crime and corruption flourish in such situations? Survival takes many forms, and human life is cheap where poverty prevails.

My last experience was as Deputy Force Commander of the 8,000-strong Peacekeeping Force (PKF) in East Timor. I am convinced that the PKF, and its Multinational Force (MNF) predecessor – known as InterFET, both performed to a very high standard. But I am equally convinced that some things could have been done better. In East Timor I witnessed the inexperience of a UN civil administration labouring to put a country back together. The UN was not created for such purposes, but it is being adapted to meet this challenge and frequently blamed when things go wrong.

In East Timor I saw the judicial and penal systems stagnate for many months; I saw reconstruction painfully slow to get started; and I saw many of the international Civilian Police unprepared and under-resourced, failing to win the confidence of the people they were there to assist.

InterFET and the PKF proved to be very professional forces, but it was frustrating to see PKF military engineers considerably under-utilised because the UN could not resolve simple procurement problems.

Thankfully, this situation improved, but it took a long time and valuable opportunities were lost. I was also constantly aggravated by our failure to optimise UN air assets to get building materiel to the countryside – again because of UN regulations. And I was amazed that some countries would agree to the self-sustainment of their contingents, and then fail to provide them fully with the necessary logistic support to get the job done.

Yes, it is easy to become dispirited and disillusioned about peace operations. And in assessing the many UN failures it has become almost common national practice to blame the inefficiency and bureaucracy of the UN – often forgetting that the UN can only be what each of the member states are prepared to make it.

I remain committed to helping improve the UN's effectiveness to undertake peace operations. There are three simple reasons:

- First, because peace operations are becoming more the norm than the exception we had better get them right. Coalitions must be workable, and member states must improve the ability of the UN to deliver the goods. And by and large the successes have outnumbered the failures, it is just that they have not received the same attention as catastrophes such as Somalia, Rwanda, and Srebrenica.
- Second, political and military leaders have a real responsibility to ensure that their servicemen and women do not die or are not injured because of inadequate preparation or inappropriate procedures.
- And third, and most importantly, all personnel deployed to peace missions (military and civilian) must be able to work with, and not



against, the people they have been sent to assist. This requires an understanding of and respect for local culture and history.

As CEO of Austcare, I now work more directly with people affected by poverty, with a particular focus on those displaced through natural disaster and conflict. Austcare is a non-sectarian and all-Australian NGO, which has worked in more than 30 countries since 1967. Currently, AUSTCARE is supporting 34 projects in 11 countries, valued at around \$14 million. The organisation works to build human security in a number of sectors, including health, education, capacity building, food security, humanitarian demining, and the provision of trained civilian Protection Officers to UN agencies such as OCHA, UNHCR and UNICEF. The geographic focus of Austcare's programs is shaped by the location of refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees, and those affected by landmines.

(SLIDE 16 – Evolution of Peacekeeping)
The Evolution of Peacekeeping

Over the past 60 years peacekeeping has evolved from monitoring and observer missions to complex peace operations, including humanitarian relief and state-building. This evolution of UN peacekeeping can be summed up as being "from thin blue line" to "complex peace operations". The range of operations have included: humanitarian intervention, peace enforcement, the facilitation of democratic elections, strengthening the rule of law, demobilizing armies, training military and police forces, initiating mechanisms for human rights, promoting women's rights, quick impact projects, and longer-term development. Considerable changes have occurred within the UN, often in a reactive manner to the lessons learned along the way, and generally with inadequate resources and insufficient contingency planning. The degree of UN authority in these operations has differed. Sometimes mandates have been constrained, and sometimes quite liberal. On occasions the UN has been designated as the lead agency, but on other occasions the UN has played an equal or subordinate role to national governments and other International Organisations. In recent times, for example, the role and authority of the UN in places like Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan, Iraq, Sierra Leone, and Sudan/Darfur has been quite different.

This transition in peacekeeping has not occurred in a strict linear and chronological manner. There was a surge in peacekeeping operations

immediately following the end of the Cold War, with increased attention being given to internal conflicts in what have been termed “new wars”. But analysts who prefer a chronological explanation are confronted with too many exceptions to the rule: for example, there was Korea in the 1950s which demonstrated the UN’s application of collective security; in the 1960s UN operations in the Congo demonstrated peace enforcement; and in 1990 Namibia’s independence demonstrated the UN’s role in elections and transitional governance.

During the Cold War the UN initiated 14 peacekeeping missions between 1945 and 1987. In the first five years following the Cold War, between 1988 and 1993, the UN authorised 21 new missions, more than the total for the previous 40 years. At least a dozen of these can be attributed to the cessation of superpower patronage with the ending of the Cold War. However, all but five of these new missions were actually traditional peacekeeping operations, the exceptions being missions in Cambodia (UNTAC), Croatia and Bosnia (UNPROFOR), and Somalia (UNOSOM I and II and UNITAF). In this period UN peacekeeping numbers expanded to over 70,000, but all except 10,000 of these occurred in Cambodia, Somalia and Bosnia/Croatia. Probably of more significance was the active involvement of Britain and the US in peacekeeping, which drew-in the involvement of other States. Between 1988 and 1994, an additional 41 States took part in UN peacekeeping operations for the first time. During the same period another 21 States became involved in non-UN peacekeeping, mainly through the US-led operations in Haiti, and OSCE and CIS missions in the former Soviet Union. Peacekeeping was becoming a core activity of military forces more widely, even if adequate training and doctrine was not in place.

Following the sensational peacekeeping failures in Somalia (1993), Rwanda (1994) and Srebrenica (1995), support for UN peacekeeping significantly diminished. By 1996, the number of UN deployed peacekeepers had reduced to around 20,000, although an additional 40,000 peacekeepers remained active with NATO, OSCE and ECOWAS. From 1994 to 1999, five new UN missions were authorized in Angola, Macedonia, Sierra Leone, Haiti and Tajikistan, but these were small in size and reflected traditional peacekeeping. Interest in more complex UN peacekeeping missions was reactivated in 1999 with four new missions to Kosovo (UNMIK), East Timor (UNAMET and UNTAET), the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), and Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).

Today, there are more UN missions than ever, but many of these are in Africa and they are generally under-resourced.

During the late 1990s, and particularly following the disaster of Rwanda where 80,000 Tutsis and Hutu moderates were slaughtered, debate was gaining momentum for the UN to take a more active role in ensuring the protection of vulnerable communities. Under the leadership of Canada, and with considerable international consensus from medium and smaller States, the "Responsibility to Protect (R2P)" by way of legitimate intervention was advocated as a future role for UN peacekeepers. Still smarting from its experience in Somalia, and critical of the professionalism of UN military forces and civilian administrators, the US showed little interest in promoting humanitarian intervention under UN auspices, unless it was in its own national interests (as demonstrated in Haiti).

The terrorist attacks of Nine/Eleven 2001, and the consequent War on Terrorism, put paid to this initiative, although the argument has regained momentum with the report of the *High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change* in December 2004, and in the Secretary General's report of March 2005, *In Larger Freedom*. At the world leaders' forum in September 2005, 190 states agreed to R2P.

Many contemporary peace operations have been referred to as "second generation peacekeeping", or "extended peacekeeping", or "complex peace operations", meaning that they go beyond the confines of traditional peacekeeping in their complexity and challenge. It was to address these enormous challenges that the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi, was convened, and the recommendations in their report of August 2000 have had a significant impact on the future of peacekeeping. Considerable attention was given by the panel to the lessons from previous missions, and particularly to Kosovo and East Timor which were ongoing at the time of their deliberations.

Key recommendations in the Brahimi Report include:

- increased support to the UN from member States (which does not seem to have occurred),
- clearer and achievable mandates which are properly resourced,
- reform of Secretariat functions and strengthening of DPKO,
- establishment of Integrated Mission Task Forces to enhance planning and improve coordination within the UN,

- improvement to relations between the Secretariat and field missions,
- financial reforms to pay for peacekeeping through the regular budget,
- improvement to civilian policing,
- new and streamlined logistic arrangements, and
- enhancement to the UN's rapid deployment capability for military and civilian elements.

Many of the internal reforms to the UN have been implemented, but most member states have remained reluctant to fully support stand-by arrangements for rapid deployment, particularly for military and police forces.

In summary, peacekeeping has evolved since the formation of the UN at the end of World War 2. From the end of the Cold War, peace operations have become more numerous and more complex, but the great majority of new missions have still been in the form of traditional peacekeeping, or hybrids of it. Nor has the UN been the sole actor in peacekeeping operations: increasingly, international and regional organisations have been conducting peace operations both with and without UN mandates. The UN can boast many successes of peacekeeping, to varying degrees, in places like Cambodia, East Timor, Eastern Slavonia/Croatia, El Salvador, Haiti, Mozambique, Namibia, and Nicaragua. But these successes have been eclipsed by UN failures in Somalia, Rwanda and Srebrenica. Other missions have continued with uncertainty as to their utility – Kashmir, Palestine and Cyprus might be included in this category.

(SLIDE 17 – UN Command and Control)
UN Command and Control

The UN's system of command and control is simple in theory, but more complicated in practice. Overall authority for peace operations resides in the Secretariat at UN Headquarters in New York – more commonly referred to as "UNNY". Mandates must be sanctioned by the Security Council before the Secretary-General can open missions, although preparatory work is often undertaken in advance of the mandate. The Secretariat comprises a large number of Departments and Offices, which often results in the UN being labeled as a huge and unwieldy bureaucracy. In fact, the headquarters-to-field ratio is much lower than in most national bureaucracies or multinational corporations, and



key departments have generally been understaffed and under-resourced.

Most peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions come under the authority of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), which includes a Military Advisor (normally at two or three star rank) and a Military Planning Staff. Since the Brahimi Report, considerable enhancement has occurred within the Secretariat, and particularly in DPKO.

For all major missions, the Secretary-General appoints a Head of Mission known as the Special Representative to the Secretary-General, or SRSG. The SRSG is required to network with many UN Departments and Agencies, as well as with governments, international organisations, and even non-state actors on occasions, but his/her principal point of contact in the UN system is normally the Under-Secretary-General heading the DPKO.

In the field, and depending on the size and role of the mission, the SRSG will normally have a number of key component heads as part of the mission, one of which will be the Force Commander if military peacekeepers are deployed.

(SLIDE 18 – Photo of INTERFET/UNTAET Handover)

This photo of the handover from InterFET to the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) in February 2000 helps explain both the nature of UN command and control, and the differences between UN PKFs and MNFs. The Commander of the InterFET MNF, Major General Peter Cosgrove from Australia, reported solely to the Australian Chief of Defence Force (CDF) in Canberra. General Cosgrove cooperated fully with the UN and other agencies in country, but so long as he operated within the UN mandate he was not bound by UN processes or procedures. By contrast, the UN Force Commander, Lieutenant General Jaime de los Santos from the Philippines, who assumed command from General Cosgrove, was fully responsible to the SRSG, Sergio Vieira de Mello, and was but one of the SRSG's key component heads (the rest of whom are not shown in this photo). So whereas an MNF is primarily a military operation, a PKF primarily provides military support to achieve grander political objectives. From the time of transition in East Timor, **all** PKF military operations were conducted under the authority of the SRSG. More importantly, all military activities needed to be synchronized with a



much broader civil administration, while at the same time ensuring a secure environment and preparing the country for independence.

UNTAET represents the high water mark of UN authority to date, but it is unlikely that these conditions will be replicated in many future missions. So UNTAET should be seen more as the exception than the rule. Nevertheless, the principle of the Force Commander being subordinate to the SRSG, and therefore the military component remaining under civil authority, is the standard for all UN operations where military forces are deployed under its control.

A complicating issue for the UN is the vast number of UN Agencies that are active in mission areas – OCHA, UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, OHCHR, UNOPS, and UNDP, to name the major ones. These Agencies have their Headquarters in various locations around the globe – New York, Geneva, Rome – to which their field representatives are required to report. In recent years, and largely as a result of the Brahimi Report of 2000, Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs) are now established within the Secretariat (normally under the auspices of DPKO) to plan and coordinate mission requirements. In the field, these various UN agencies are now being required to operate more collaboratively either under the SRSG, or under the authority of an assigned Humanitarian Coordinator (where an SRSG has not been appointed).

(SLIDE 19 – Military Command in the Field)

In terms of military command in the field, and as a generalization, I think that a UN Force Commander probably exercises less authority than his MNF counterpart. This is because the operating doctrine and regulations for military alliances, such as NATO, are already established and better understood; or because “coalitions of the willing” (such as InterFET) agree to the general principles and modus operandi of a lead nation for the operation.

In all coalition operations, however, whether MNF or UN, the authority of national command is always paramount - or to put it another way, UN or coalition authority is always subordinate to national command. Most differences can be accommodated, but not always. For example, there were occasions in East Timor when national contingents (including Australia) obeyed instructions from their capitals that were not sanctioned or requested by the SRSG or the Force Commander. Being alert to these political realities, and being approachable, firm and flexible, are essential traits for successful UN Force Commanders.

An outstanding example of a UN Force Commander was Lieutenant General John Sanderson (from Australia) in Cambodia. I also consider that the successive Thai Force Commanders in East Timor, Lieutenant General Boonsrang and Lieutenant General Winai, to be in this category.

Another major difference between MNF and PKF operations is in the area of logistics, administration and air support. Whereas an MNF commander would normally have authority over these areas and be able to plan and assign assets to achieve mission objectives, a UN Force Commander is far more constrained. This is because in UN missions the Chief Administrative Officer retains authority over such assets and priority tends to be given to routine administrative tasks for the whole UN mission rather than the conduct of military operations. As well, most MNF contingents are either fully self-supporting or are administratively supported by another nation. In the case of UN forces from developing countries this is not the case, and they remain reliant on the UN supply and procurement system which is not always responsive and optimized to achieve specific mission success. Overall, there tends to be less flexibility for military forces within the UN system than under an MNF, but improvements in this area have been occurring over recent years. This is one very good reason why military forces from developed countries should become more active in UN peacekeeping – because they are able to bring more to the table.

Planning and Preparation

One of the reasons why the Brahimi Report recommended the formation of IMTFs was because numerous post-mission reports highlighted repetition of the same mistakes.

(SLIDE 20 – Security Council)

The dilemma facing the Secretary-General is how to present the Security Council with mission analysis and mandates based on thorough contingency planning. IMTFs provide one such mechanism, but since the Brahimi Report was released, IMTFs have had only limited success.

(SLIDE 21: Some Military Lessons)

In my own analysis of the UN in East Timor (as recorded in my book *Peacekeeping in East Timor: the Path to Independence*), I highlight a number of military and more general lessons that could have been

addressed if there had been better preparation and planning. Shown on this slide are 10 improvements that would have made for a more proficient military Peacekeeping Force in East Timor. All of these could have been achieved if better preparation and planning had occurred and had adequate resources been assigned:

- More civil-military and constabulary capabilities
- Earlier appointment of Force Commander
- Earlier Force Commander's Directive
- Pre-Training of Force Headquarters
- Confirmation of Rules of Engagement (ROE) before deployment
- Improved police-military coordination
- Ensuring the right force mix
- Selecting the best force multipliers
- More responsive logistic support
- Use of political and anthropological advice

(SLIDE 22 – Conduct of Peacekeeping Operations)
The Conduct of Peacekeeping Operations

What about the conduct of peacekeeping operations on the ground by the military component? What are the key factors for effective operations? This slide lists seven key issues that I think important:

- Well trained and resourced troops
- Culturally aware and accepting by the host population
- Capable command and frequent field visits
- An effective military reporting system
- A "whole of mission" approach
- Close relations with host-country military leaders
- Avoiding mission creep

(SLIDE 23 – Security/Governance/Development stool)

In complex peace operations – such as those in East Timor, Haiti, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq (to name but a few) – there is need to think beyond military operations to a much more "whole of mission" effort.

We might, therefore, think of state-building in terms of a three-legged stool. If any leg is too underdeveloped the stool will collapse. The security leg provides the safe environment in which development can occur. But security is much broader than traditional concepts of improving government instrumentalities and security forces, as



important as these are. Effective security also demands the building of capacity at the grassroots, embracing the essential elements of human security, the rights of people to live in dignity, free from want. Simply put, people need to see an improvement in their lives at the grassroots level.

Governance, which includes the rule of law, is a critical component in strengthening civil society. But governance goes well beyond the architecture of government, and to be effective must permeate to and be developed within all strata of society. The strength of civil society rests not on an elected government, but on the culture and processes that underpin societies. Generally, major donors should give more attention than hitherto to promoting the development of grassroots governance, and should provide greater financial assistance to NGOs and volunteer agencies in this area.

Effective development must be 'quick impact', protracted and sustainable. In states emerging from conflict or natural disaster a continuum is required from emergency assistance to sustainable development.

These three legs must be progressed together, but they also need to be strengthened by the application of human rights and with the allocation of sufficient financial and human resources.



Numerous case studies of developing countries illustrate that better prioritization and coordination between donors and recipients is required. Greater synchronization is required between state and non-state actors. In other words, governments, international organisations like the UN and the World Bank Group, NGOs, and the corporate sector can work more cooperatively to 'make poverty history' and achieve the Millennium Development Goals. This is a model that Austcare advocates and is committed to implement.

(SLIDE 24 –Peacekeeping 'Bakers Dozen')
Successful Intervention

From my analysis of the InterFET and UNTAET interventions in East Timor, I suggested 13 factors that should be considered prior to intervention. While each conflict situation will be unique, this *Peacekeeping 'Baker's Dozen'* provides a useful checklist for consideration. Not all of these factors will apply in all situations, but where relevant they help provide a road map for success. They can also be applied to MNF interventions that are not under UN authority, and you might wish to reflect on how the current Iraqi campaign measures-up against these factors. These factors can be asked in the form of questions:

1. How legitimate is the intervention?
2. Is there sustained international commitment?
3. Are there achievable political objectives & exit strategy?
4. To what extent is there host-country support?
5. Is there a feasible & achievable mandate?
6. Has there been thorough & timely preparation & planning?
7. Is it possible to restore & maintain a secure environment?
8. Can there be effective governance?
9. Does the mission have capable leadership & effective partnerships?
10. What are the prospects for sustainable economic & social development?
11. Can human rights be implemented and the past addressed?
12. What is required to effectively manage displaced people?
13. Can emergency relief be implemented effectively?

Even a cursory glance at these factors indicates that successful intervention is much more than a military response, and that peace operations must be seen in a broad context.

(SLIDES 25: Questions)

Conclusion

Let me conclude by stressing the importance of peace operations, by advocating their mainstreaming into military establishments, and by requesting member states to do more to enhance the UN's capabilities to prosecute peace operations more successfully. I think the alternatives to doing this are rather bleak.

Thank you for your attention and I look forward to your questions.